This agreement is ratified by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and enters into force from the date of exchange of ratification instruments. [4] The agreement was ratified on 28 July 1972 and entered into force on 4 August 1972. In the end, during the Shimla final, Gandhi evolved as a swing factor between strength and accommodating postures. The alternative of calling Bhutto`s bluff and leaving without agreement, Gandhi and Haksar were deemed too expensive after India`s dramatic triumph in 1971. The self-limitation that underpinned India`s attitude was all too noticeable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their negotiator, later noted that “India`s excessive fear of avoiding the failure of the talks at all costs has become its great handicap,” while it held “all the negotiating tokens.” Haksar later noted that “force negotiations” are part of the diplomatic currency. But negotiating with someone weak is even more difficult. Indira Gandhi`s reputation for intelligent state art is widely celebrated, even by her most outspoken critics. Their quest for peacemakers was as audacious as India approached the 1972 peace conference in Shimla. But the fall of 1972 is fascinating for what it did not reflect — India did not use the fruits of the victory of the 1971 war to find an advantageous geopolitical solution. Finally, for the first time since partition, India is negotiating with Pakistan the strength and prestige of a position of strength (of prisoners of war); 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, including all military leaders in eastern Pakistan, surrendered to the Indian armed forces. India had also conquered strategic sites in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles from Pakistani territory in Sindh and the south of the city. On July 2, 1972, the two countries reached an agreement. The main clauses of the Simla agreement are: in the hope of saving an agreement, Bhutto called Gandhi directly.

During the climate meeting, Gandhi stressed the main advantage of the Indian proposal in Kashmir – neither side was forced to physically abandon the territory or exchange populations. With “obvious feeling and sincerity,” Bhutto acknowledged that India`s proposal was the only possible one, but that a legally binding commitment would significantly weaken its domestic political position and strengthen the military establishment. He could give nothing but oral assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir, in Bhutto`s words, would gradually acquire the “characteristics of an international border.” On the other hand, India`s concession was concrete and in advance. India abandoned its “package arrangement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before concluding an agreement on Kashmir.”